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Book Review
Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception, Edited by Alva Noë and Evan
Thompson. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002, Introduction, index. 627pp. ISBN 0-262-64047-3 (paperback),
$38.00.
This collection is well-suited for students seeking a one-volume introduction to the long conversation in
philosophy surrounding visual perception. The chronological arrangement of key articles (a total of 23,
all but one previously published) makes this, effectively, a documentary history of a decidedly
interdisciplinary discussion beginning with Maurice Merleau-Ponty (a selection from his 1945
Phenomenology of Perception) and continuing through Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers. More than
history, it is also a substantive contribution to the conversation, a philosophical argument structured in a
traditional fashion with roots at least as old as Aristotle: the editors choose not only what to include but
also where to begin, and they get both the first and last words.
Since the direction of the argument is toward visual perception as active (or, more properly, interactive)
and embodied, Merleau-Ponty is an excellent--and hardly surprising--point of departure. As a
philosophical argument, this collection guides readers toward a vision of vision as something an
organism does rather than an internal "mental" process. The editors place vision not in the head, but in
the world. This enables them to draw on several important theoretical traditions that might otherwise
appear entirely incompatible. J.J. Gibson's "ecological" approach, for example, is well-represented--
though the editors introduce a comparative perspective that is, arguably, more consistently ecological
than the one developed by Gibson and his followers; and they include some of the most trenchant
criticism of the Gibsonian approach. What emerges from this conversation is an inter active process in
which neither organism nor environment is passive. Though Jean Piaget doesn't even make a cameo
appearance here (perhaps because he is rarely thought of as a philosopher or as a theorist of perception),
his understanding of cognitive structures in the context of a biological process of equilibration and
adaptation is an indispensible part of the theoretical background. In the foreground are computational
theorists such as David Marr, and the vast literature on information processing is present even where
(perhaps especially where) it is in dispute.
The editors' introductory essay gives a clear roadmap of the discussion, placing key articles vis-à-vis an
"orthodox" view that is largely rejected: "The works collected in this volume target a distinct
philosophical and scientific orthodoxy about the nature of perception. Some of the papers defend the
orthodoxy; most criticize it; and some set forth positive alternatives to it. Each selection provides, we
believe, a crucial moment in the articulation of an important family of problems for contemporary
philosophy of perception" (1). The collection, then, is a series of crucial moments, each of which could
be (and, in most cases, has been) the occasion for a substantive philosophical discussion. This is
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particularly appropriate for seminars in which students are seeking to join a conversation rather than
simply encountering it as an historically done deal: virtually every selection is an invitation. The
selections are, in many cases, already recognized as classics in the field; and the editors have included
either complete articles or substantial selections, so readers will not be left with the feeling of having
only been exposed to snippets. Readers who do wish to explore material further will welcome the
references included with each selection. These effectively extend the conversation back to John Locke
and beyond, so students who master this book will be well-grounded in the history of the field as well as
the work of theorists who currently dominate it.
Noë and Thompson describe the "orthodox view" as a "computational" one that "treats perception as a
'subpersonal' process carried out by functional subsystems or modules instantiated in the person's or
animal's brain." This treatment means that orthodox theorists (Pylyshyn is cited as a recent example) treat
perception as "cognitively impenetrable": "the beliefs and expectations of the perceiver are thought to
have no influence on the character of the subpersonal computations that constitute perception" (2-3).
Orthodox theorists have also contended that "every conscious perceptual state of the subject" corresponds
to "a particular set of neurons...whose activities are sufficient, as a matter of scientific law, for the
occurrence of that state" (3). Much of the research in visual perception guided by this argument has been
concerend with locating such sets of neurons and activities, "the bridge locus" (Davida Teller) or the
"neural correlate of consciousness" (David Chalmers) for visual perception. These "orthodox" theorists
are well-represented in the collection, but Noë and Thompson also gather representatives of "a significant
heterodoxy in visual science (and cognitive science more generally)" (3). This heterodoxy encompasses a
number of "alternative research programs," but the unifying factor is "the inseparability of perception and
action" (3). Noë and Thompson divide the representatives of this heterodoxy into four categories: the
"ecological" approach (associated with Gibson), which approaches perception as "an act of the whole
animal" (3); the "enactive" approach (associated with Maturana and Varela), which approaches
perception as a self-organizing activity of the nervous system that generates "the perceptuo-motor domain
of the animal" (5); the "animate vision" approach (associated with Ballard), "at the interface of
computational vision, artificial intelligence, and robotics" (5), concerned with "how the facts of
sensorimotor embodiment shape perception" (6); and "sensorimotor contingency theory" (associated with
O'Regan and Noë), which argues that "Visual experience is not something that happens in an individual.
It is something he or she does" (6).
That Noë is one of the names associated with "sensorimotor contingency theory" is a reminder that this
collection is an argument as well as a documentary history. That visual experience is something one does
is the first word and the last (567) in this collection; and the case (which draws on the whole range of
"heterodox" theory while carefully and fairly introducing readers to the prevailing "orthodoxy") is
persuasive. This is an excellent introduction for students of perceptual theory, made more effective by the
fact that the editors practice what they preach: students who encounter this collection are invited not to
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